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Utah at the Crossroads: The Role of the Judiciary in
Initiative and Severability Law after Gallivan v. Walker
I. INTRODUCTION
“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I,
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.”1
In deciding the highly controversial case of Gallivan v. Walker2 the
Utah Supreme Court found itself in a situation analogous to the
predicament Robert Frost describes in “The Road Not Taken.”3 The
Gallivan plaintiffs were sponsors of an initiative that would place
significant restrictions on the transportation of nuclear waste within the
state of Utah.4 When their initiative ran afoul of Utah’s multi-county
signature provision, the plaintiffs brought an emergency petition for an
extraordinary writ before the court. The plaintiffs argued that the multicounty signature requirement was unconstitutional and could be severed
from the remaining portions of Utah’s initiative law.5 The plaintiffs’
petition left the court at a legal crossroads. If the court found for the
plaintiffs, it would, without legislative input, drastically alter
legislatively created initiative procedures that had remained practically
unchanged since the original grant of the initiative power in 1900. On the
other hand, if the court ruled against the plaintiffs, then the people’s
access to the initiative power would be reduced or, in the event the court
found the signature provision unconstitutional and nonseverable,
temporarily eliminated.
Just as the paths in Frost’s poem diverged at the crossroads and led
to very different destinations, the members of the Utah Supreme Court
split over Gallivan and followed separate lines of reasoning to reach the
opposing outcomes mentioned above. Gallivan’s dissent argued that the
signature requirement was constitutional and that Utah’s initiative law

1. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in COLLECTED POEMS 45 (Jane Doe ed., Classic
Books 1995), available at http://www.robertfrost.org/indexgood.
2. 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002).
3. FROST, supra note 1, at 45.
4. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1076.
5. Id.
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was nonseverable.6 In contrast, Gallivan’s majority held that the
signature requirement was unconstitutional and that the requirement was
severable from the remainder of Utah’s initiative law.7
This note demonstrates how the Gallivan majority erred when it
ignored conventional legal precedent governing initiative and
severability law and instead employed unconventional legal analysis to
find that Utah’s signature requirement was unconstitutional and
severable. More specifically, this note examines how the majority
misapplied or overlooked Utah legal precedent governing two areas of
law: (1) the definition of a fundamental right, and (2) the rules of
construction governing the severability of legislative provisions. In
addition, this Note addresses the policy reasons supporting a return to
more conventional legal principles when analyzing initiative law in the
context of fundamental rights and severability law in the context of
statutory construction. With this objective, Section II provides a brief
history of initiative and severability laws applicable in Utah. Section III
provides a summary of Gallivan v. Walker and illustrates how the
majority and dissenting opinions disagree on every material issue in the
case. Finally, section IV analyzes problems created by the majority’s
characterization of fundamental rights and severability issues. It also
demonstrates how proper adherence to current legal precedents would
prevent the legal dilemmas otherwise inherent in the majority’s analysis.
The case note ends with a brief summary of the relevant legal
conclusions outlined in the preceding sections.
II. UTAH’S INITIATIVE AND SEVERABILITY LAWS PRIOR TO GALLIVAN V.
WALKER
A. A Brief Overview of Initiative Law in Utah
1. How signature requirements regulate access to Utah’s initiative
ballot
Inspired by the populist movement at the end of the nineteenth
century,8 Utah amended its Constitution in 1900 and thus became only
the second state to allow its citizens to adopt legislation by initiative.9
This constitutional amendment specifies:
6. Id. at 1103-19.
7. Id. at 1076-1103.
8. Id.
9. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION XX
(Temple University Press 1989).
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The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute,
may . . . initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to
the people for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the
legislation, as provided by statute.10

Although the Constitutional provision was created in 1900, the Utah
Legislature did not create statutes setting forth the “numbers . . . the
conditions [and] the manner” in which initiatives qualified for the ballot
until 1917.11 The Legislature’s original statutory provisions for
initiatives, written in 1917, contained both a multi-country signature
requirement and a statewide signature requirement.12
The two original signature requirements created in 1917 did not
change substantively until 1998. In 1998, the Legislature amended the
initiative statute and changed the multi-county signature requirement
from fifteen counties to twenty counties. Both the statewide and the
amended multi-county signature requirements applied to all Utah
initiative petitions from 1998 until the court’s recent decision in Gallivan
v. Walker. The 1998 signature requirements read as follows:
A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to a vote of the people
for approval or rejection shall obtain
(i) legal signatures equal to 10% of the cumulative total of all votes cast
for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at
which a governor was elected; and
(ii) from each of at least 20 counties, legal signatures equal to 10% of
the total of all votes cast in that county for all candidates for governor
at the last regular general election at which a governor was elected.13

An individual who wants to put an initiative on the ballot must
satisfy several other prerequisites in addition to fulfilling the signature
requirements. Persons wishing to circulate a statewide initiative petition
must start the process by filing an application and a copy of the proposed
law with the Lieutenant Governor.14 The application must be endorsed by

10. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(i)(A) (2002).
11. See Intervenors’ Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 4, Gallivan
v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545).
12. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-11-1, 3 (1993). The original multi-county signature
requirement read in pertinent part: “Legal voters of this state in the number required herein . . . may
initiate any desired legislation, and cause the same to be submitted . . . to a vote of the people for
approval or rejection . . . provided that in order to make any such petition mandatory a majority [15
of 29] of all counties of the state must each furnish signatures of legal voters not less in number than
the percentages herein required.” § 20-11-1.
13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (2002).
14. Initiative and Referendum Institute, The Basic Steps to do an Initiative in Utah,
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, March 18, 2003, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ Utah.htm
(last visited on March 18, 2003).
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five sponsors who are registered voters and who have voted in Utah’s
general election in each of the past three years.15 Before allowing the
initiative’s proponents to begin circulating the petition, the Lieutenant
Governor must allow the Attorney General to review the initiative
application.16 Even after sending the initiative application to the Attorney
General for review, the Lieutenant Governor can still reject the
application if the law it proposes (1) is patently unconstitutional, (2) is
nonsensical, or (3) could not become a law if passed.17 Once the
initiative’s sponsors have collected a sufficient number of signatures, and
the signatures are verified as meeting Utah’s statutory signature
requirements, the Lieutenant Governor will qualify the initiative for the
ballot.18
2. Utah’s definition of a “fundamental right” in the context of initiative
law
The sharp divergence of Gallivan’s majority and dissenting opinions
regarding the constitutionality of the multi-county signature requirement
can be traced back to whether Utah’s right to the initiative can be defined
as a fundamental right. Petitioners contended that the signature
requirement was unconstitutional because it violated equal protection
principles.19 Both parties in Gallivan acknowledged that the level of
scrutiny applied in equal protection cases hinges upon whether the right
at issue is a fundamental right.20
“The ability to pursue a change in the law through the initiative
process is solely a state created right.”21 There is no federal initiative
right.22 “However, once a state creates an initiative process, the system
must comport with the protections afforded under the U.S.
Constitution.”23 Thus, there is no fundamental federal initiative right, but,
depending upon the specific laws within the jurisdiction, a state-created
initiative right might be considered fundamental.
In the 1980 Utah Supreme Court case Utah Public Employees
Association v. Utah,24 the court set forth guidelines as to what constituted
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1084-85 (Utah 2002).
20. Id. at 1084-85, 1104.
21. Id. at 1101 (Thorne, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
22. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988); Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd 279 F.3d
1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2002).
23. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1101 (Thorne, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
24. 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980).
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a fundamental right within the State. The petitioners in this case
attempted to assert that the right to hunt wild buffalo, sheep, and moose
was a fundamental right.25 In denying the petitioners’ claim, the Utah
Supreme Court noted that “the catalog of fundamental [rights] is
relatively small to date and includes such things as the rights to vote, to
procreate, and to travel interstate.”26 The court went on to identify what
separates fundamental rights like voting and procreation from
nonfundamental rights by indicating that “[o]nly those rights which form
an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society can be called
fundamental.”27
In 1957, the Utah Supreme Court indirectly addressed the question of
whether the initiative power fits Utah’s definition of a fundamental right
in Schriver v. Bench.28 The petitioners in Schriver argued that the
initiative power enabled the general populace to set firefighter and police
salaries by means of an initiative vote.29 The court found that the
initiative power could not be used to set firefighter and police salaries
because such action was administrative in nature and initiative laws only
apply to legislative matters.30
Besides limiting the scope of the initiative power to legislative
issues, the Utah Supreme Court used Schriver to implicitly place
additional restrictions on the initiative power. For example, although the
court acknowledged that the people did have the ultimate control over
government salaries, the court indicated that in this instance the initiative
was not a proper means by which the people could exercise that
control.31 Instead, the court held that the people could adequately express
their will through their elected representatives.32 By holding that the
initiative power could be restricted when other political options (i.e., the
election of new representatives) imbued the people with the ability to
effect the desired changes, the Utah Supreme Court implied that the
initiative power does not form an implicit part of life in a free society.33

25. Id. at 1273.
26. Id.
27. Id. From the federal perspective the United States Supreme Court has referred to
fundamental rights as being those rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
28. 313 P.2d 475 (Utah 1957).
29. Id. at 476
30. Id. at 476, 480.
31. Id. at 479-80.
32. Id. at 479.
33. Id.
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B. An Overview of Severability
The implications associated with the Gallivan court’s decision as to
whether the multi-county signature requirement is severable from the rest
of Utah’s initiative law extend beyond resolving the status of plaintiffs’
initiative action. If the signature provision had been held to be
nonseverable, then the entire initiative law might be struck down and the
plaintiffs would be left without a mechanism to place their initiative on
the ballot.34 However, when the court found, contrary to the assertions of
Utah’s Legislature, that the signature provision was severable, it may
have infringed upon the powers and responsibilities that Utah’s
Constitution grants to the Legislature.
Severability issues may arise when a court decides that a legislative
act is partially invalid. “The severability question asks whether a court’s
holding that part of a statute is invalid causes the remainder of the statute
to be invalid as well.”35 In such instances a court must determine whether
to sever the defective provision (while upholding the rest of the provision
as good law) or to invalidate the entire statute. While severability is a
fundamental legal concept, courts have generally indicated that a statute
is only severable when certain conditions are met.36 Under these certain
conditions, an unconstitutional portion of a statute may only be severed if
(1) the remaining provisions in the legislative act can actually function
without the invalid provision, and (2) the legislature would have enacted
the remaining provisions of the statute without the invalid provisions.37
1. If the valid portions of a statute do not constitute a complete and
serviceable act after the unconstitutional provision is excised, then the
provisions of the act are not severable
“To be severable, the valid portion of an enactment must be
independent of the invalid portion and must form a complete act within
itself.”38 If the valid portion of the enactment cannot stand alone as a
complete act, then even an express statement of the legislature’s intent to
make the statute severable will not preserve the valid portion of the
statute. For example, in Albuquerque v. Cauwels & Davis, Management
Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court indicated that a city ordinance

34.
omitted).
35.
2001).
36.
37.
38.

Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1098 (Utah 2002) (Thorne, J., dissenting) (citations
2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 44A:16, at 874 (N. Singer ed., 6th ed.
See id. § 44:1, at 548.
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:1, at 566.
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governing taxation of businesses was not severable because the valid
portions of the ordinance were “inextricably intertwined with the invalid
portions of the ordinance.”39 Utah has also held that statutes cannot be
severed if the provisions of the statute are interrelated. In 1968 the Utah
Supreme Court found that “even where a [severability] clause exist[s],
where the provisions of the statute are interrelated, it is not within the
scope of this court’s function to select the valid portions of the act and
conjecture that they should stand independently of the portions which are
invalid.”40
2. Severability is primarily a matter of legislative intent
Valid portions of a statute that are not inextricably entwined with the
invalid portions of the statute may be severable if the legislature intended
such provisions to be severable.41 In fact, “Severability . . . where part of
a statute is unconstitutional is primarily a matter of legislative intent.”42
“The test fundamentally is whether the legislature would have passed the
statute without the objectionable part.”43 In Stewart v. Utah Public
Service Commission, the Utah Supreme Court explained how courts
should determine legislative intent regarding the severability of a statute:
Whether a part of a statute that is held unconstitutional is severable
from the remainder of the statue depends on legislative intent. Where
that intent is not expressly stated, a court will infer the probable
legislative intent from the relationship of the unconstitutional provision
to the remaining sections of the statute by determining whether the
remaining sections, standing alone, will further the legislative
purpose.44

This test lists several different factors that can help determine
legislative intent. Other factors, like the general presumption in favor of
severability, are implied rather than expressly stated. Whether expressly
or implicitly identified, the factors that are generally used to determine
severability include (1) a presumption in favor of severability, (2)
severability clauses, and (3) legislative history.
a. Legislation is generally presumed to be severable. The presumption
that a legislature intended its legislation to be severable is derived from
several general policies of statutory construction. These policies indicate
that, (1) “statutes should be construed to sustain their constitutionality
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

632 P.2d 729, 731 (N.M. 1981).
State v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691, 696 (Utah 1968).
SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:3, at 552.
Id.
Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 211 P.2d 190, 193 (Utah 1949).
Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994).
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when it is possible to do so,” (2) “[t]he legislature is presumed not to
intend the passage of an invalid act,” and (3) “[n]o legislative action is to
be declared unconstitutional except for clear and satisfactory reasons.”45
The Utah Supreme Court adhered to these principles when it
acknowledged the existence of a general presumption in favor of
severability in Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission.46
The plaintiffs in Celebrity Club argued that section 32-1-32.6 of the
Utah Code,47 violated the Utah Constitution.48 To a certain extent, the
Utah Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs by holding that the final
sentence of section 32-1-32.6 did violate the Utah Constitution. The
court however, in order to “effect the minimum necessary disruption of
the statutory scheme,”49 only struck down the final sentence of 32-1-32.6
and upheld the rest of the statute. In explaining its decision to sever the
unconstitutional language in the statute the court stated that, “it is
axiomatic that statutes, where possible, are to be construed so as to
sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion of the statute
might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, such should
be done.”50
b. Only detailed and specific severability clauses are likely to have
significant impact on a judicial determination of severability. It has become
common practice in many states to add a severability clause51 to
legislation in the hope that the severability clause will protect valid
portions of the legislation from being found unconstitutional.52 However,
in many jurisdictions, “[b]ecause of the very frequency with which it is
used, the [severability] clause is regarded as little more than mere
formality.”53
The difficulties inherent in creating an effective severability clause
are illustrated in the Utah Supreme Court case State v. Lopes. In Lopes,
the court indicated that a severability clause could impact findings of
severability by expressly stating the intent of the legislature: “To
determine if a statute is severable from its unconstitutional subsection,
45. SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:1, at 548-49.
46. 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982).
47. UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-1-32.6 (1953). This statute gives the Utah Liquor Control
Commission plenary authority to rescind an establishment’s liquor license without giving the
establishment an opportunity to appeal the Commission’s decision in court.
48. Celebrity Club, 657 P.2d at 1294.
49. Id. at 1299.
50. Id.
51. For an example of the language in a typical severability clause see UTAH CODE ANN. §
10-1-113 (2002) (“If any chapter, part, section, paragraph or subsection of this act, or the application
thereof is held to be invalid, the remainder of this act shall not be affected thereby.”).
52. SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:8, at 585.
53. Id.
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we look to legislative intent. If the intent is not expressly stated, we then
turn to the statute itself, and examine the remaining constitutional portion
of the statute in relation to the stricken portion.”54 Severability clauses,
particularly very specific clauses, would seem to provide the express
statement of legislative intent regarding severability that is mentioned in
Lopes. A general severability clause, however, is not necessarily an
express statement of the legislature’s intent.55
Sutherland Statutory Construction states that “it is reasonable to
infer that because a general act cannot control subsequent legislative
intent and therefore is questionable evidence of it, less weight may attach
to such a general rule of [severability] than to [a severability] clause in a
separate act.”56 Thus, courts will probably hold that a general severability
clause is not an accurate indicator of whether the legislature intended a
specific piece of legislation to be severable. In contrast, a specific
severability clause embedded within an individual statute may provide
the “expressly stated” legislative intent that courts look to first when
examining questions of severability.
c. Legislative history can provide significant guidance as to legislative
intent. According to some interpretations, legislative history can provide
another “express statement” of legislative intent.57 Whether it is
considered an express statement of legislative intent or an implied
statement of legislative intent, legislative history is a factor that courts
use to determine legislative intent. In Massachusetts Public Interest
Research Group v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, for example, the
Superior Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that a multi-county
signature requirement was not severable from other provisions in the
initiative statute.58 The court explained its finding of non-severability by
alluding to an extensive body of legislative history associated with the
restriction:
The [multi-county] provision became one of the most hotly debated
issues of that convention and consumed forty-five days of the
convention’s time. The significance of the county-distribution rule to
art. 48 as a whole is reflected in the primacy afforded that provision in
the version finally adopted by the electorate.59

54. State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191, 196 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added).
55. See id. at 191.
56. SUTHERLAND supra note 35, § 44:8, at 585.
57. See Intervenors’ Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 26,
Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545).
58. 375 N.E.2d 1175, 1179-80 (Mass. 1978).
59. Id. at 1180.
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As demonstrated by the Superior Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
legislative history can play a significant role in determining the
legislature’s intentions regarding severability issues.
III. UTAH INITIATIVE LAW AND THE MULTI-COUNTY SIGNATURE
REQUIREMENT: GALLIVAN V. WALKER
A. History of the Case
On April 10, 2002, a number of Utah citizens filed an application
with Lieutenant Governor Olene Walker to circulate a petition for a
statewide initiative known as the Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act.60
The Lieutenant Governor approved the initiative for circulation on April
15, 2002.61 Although the initiative was approved for circulation, in order
to qualify for placement on the 2002 election ballot the sponsors of the
Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act needed to gather at least 76,180
certified signatures in support of the initiative. The 76,180 signatures
represented ten percent of the total number of voters statewide who voted
in the last gubernatorial election. In addition to this statewide
requirement, Utah’s multi-county signature requirement provided that the
signatures obtained by the initiative sponsors must be distributed
throughout the state. Specifically, this multi-county signature
requirement provided that the sponsors must obtain from each of at least
twenty counties, legal signatures equal to ten percent of the total of all
votes cast in that county for all candidates for governor at the last
gubernatorial election.62
By June 1, 2002, the initiative sponsors had collected over 130,000
signatures.63 Between June 1 and July 1 of 2002, opponents of the
initiative contacted individuals who had signed the petition and urged
them to remove their signatures from the petition.64 When the signatures
were delivered to the Lieutenant Governor on July 1, 2002, only 95,974
signatures remained.65 Although the 95,974 signatures collected by
proponents of the initiative surpassed Utah’s statewide requirement of
76,180 signatures, the collected signatures were concentrated in specific
counties and only met multi-county signature requirement in fourteen of
Utah’s twenty-nine counties, six counties short of the twenty counties
60. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1076 (Utah 2002).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1076-77.
63. See Intervenors’ Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ, Gallivan v.
Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545).
64. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1077.
65. Id.
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mandated under Utah law.66 The Lieutenant Governor declared the
initiative petition legally insufficient to be placed on the ballot because
the initiative sponsors failed to meet the multi-county signature
requirement.67
On July 16, 2002, the sponsors of the Radioactive Waste Restrictions
Act petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ finding
that the initiative petition was legally sufficient and compelling the
Lieutenant Governor to place the initiative on the ballot.68 The court
found that it had original jurisdiction to consider the petition for an
extraordinary writ.69
B. The Disparate Findings of the Majority and the Dissent
Gallivan v. Walker dealt primarily with three questions: (1) Is the
initiative right granted by the Utah Constitution a fundamental right, (2)
does the multi-county signature requirement violate equal protection
principles, and (3) is the multi-county signature requirement severable
from the statewide 10% signature requirement.70 The Gallivan majority
answered “yes” to all three questions. Although Gallivan’s dissent
addressed the same three questions asked by the majority, the dissent
diverged sharply from majority and answered “no” to each question.
IV. ANALYSIS: THE GALLIVAN MAJORITY ESCHEWED TRADITIONAL
BASES OF INITIATIVE JURISPRUDENCE AND SEVERABILITY LAW AND
INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE INITIATIVE RIGHT WAS FUNDAMENTAL
AND THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED THE MULTI-COUNTY
SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT TO BE SEVERABLE
A. The Gallivan Majority Erred When it Held that the Initiative Right
Guaranteed by the Utah Constitution Was a Fundamental Right
The Gallivan majority held that Utah’s “reserved right and power of
initiative is a fundamental right under article VI, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution.”71 However, the majority erred in designating the initiative
power as a fundamental right. The initiative power does not fit Utah’s
definition of a fundamental right for several reasons. First, historically,
the initiative right has not been considered a right that “form[s] an
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) (2002).
Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1077.
Id.; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-207(4) (2002).
Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1079.
See id.
Id. at 1082.
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implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society.”72 Second, the
limitations imposed on the initiative right serve to refute the claim that
the initiative right is a fundamental right; and third, the initiative right is
not inextricably connected with the admittedly fundamental right to vote
in a general election.
1. Most Americans have no right to the initiative
The Gallivan majority erred by finding that the initiative right is a
“fundamental right implicit in a free society” when neither the federal
government nor the majority of states recognize any fundamental
initiative right at all. Utah’s Supreme Court has indicated that, “only
those rights which form an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a
free society can be called fundamental.”73 Although the Utah Public
Employees Association court did not unequivocally identify what
distinguishes a fundamental right from other rights, it did note that “the
catalog of fundamental interests is relatively small to date, and includes
such things as the rights to vote, to procreate, and to travel interstate.”74
A right to place an initiative on the ballot does not fall within the
“narrow catalog” of fundamental rights because, in the United States,
initiatives are not considered an implicit part of life of a free citizen in a
free society.”75 In fact, most citizens in the United States have no
initiative rights at all. There is no federal initiative right,76 and twentyseven states refuse to recognize any state-created right of initiative.77
Since most of America’s “free society” does not recognize any right to
the initiative power, much less a fundamental right, the right to the
initiative should not be considered a fundamental right implicit in
American society.
2. The Utah Constitution imposes legislative restrictions on the initiative
right
The right of initiative guaranteed by the Utah Constitution is not a
fundamental right because the section of the constitution that creates the
initiative power also imposes significant legislative restrictions on that
power. Since the initiative power does not qualify, under Utah’s
72. Utah Pub. Employees Ass’n v. Utah, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988); Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279
F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2002).
77. Intervenors’ Supplemental Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ at
31, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545).
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definition, as a fundamental right, the argument might instead be made
that the right of initiative is a fundamental right because it is explicitly
granted by the Utah Constitution. However, such an argument fails to
consider the limitations inherent in the constitutional provision that
grants the initiative right. Article VI, section one of the Utah Constitution
states:
The legal voters of the State of Utah, in the numbers, under the
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute,
may . . . initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to
the people for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the
legislation, as provided by statute.78

While this constitutional provision does grant Utah citizens a right of
initiative, the language of the provision indicates that this initiative right
is limited.79 Indeed, according to the constitutional language, the
initiative right may only be exercised “under the conditions, in the
manner, and within the time” established by the Utah Legislature.80
Because Utah’s government created the initiative right and the
government retains the right to significantly limit the scope of the
initiative power, the initiative right should not be characterized as
fundamental.81
Fundamental rights are not subject to limitations like those imposed
on Utah’s initiative power. For example, while the initiative can only be
exercised “under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time”
established by the legislature82, the fundamental right to interstate travel
is virtually unqualified.83
In Eunique v. Powell,84 the disparity between fundamental rights that
require strict scrutiny and mere constitutional rights that do not require
strict scrutiny is readily apparent. Eunique asserted that she had a
fundamental right to international travel, similar to the fundamental right
to interstate travel, and claimed that this right could only be curtailed by
restrictions that survive strict scrutiny protections.85 The court agreed

78. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(i)(A) (2002) (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Kelly v. Macon-Bibb County Bd. of Elections, 608 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 n.1 (M.D. Ga.
1985) (“Where a state provides for an expression of direct democracy, such as by initiative or
referendum, it does so as a matter of legislative grace.”).
82. Id.
83. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). See discussion of Utah Public Employees Ass’n
supra Part IV.A.1.
84. 281 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2002).
85. Id. at 943.
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that there is a constitutional right to international travel.86 However, the
court found that the right to international travel “can be regulated within
the bounds of due process. In that respect, [the right to international
travel] differs from the constitutional right of interstate travel which is
virtually unqualified.”87 Because the right to international travel was
subject to restrictions that did not apply to the fundamental right of
interstate travel, the court declined to subject restrictions on international
travel to a strict scrutiny analysis.88
Just as the Eunique court held that the various restrictions placed on
the right to international travel prevented that right from being a
fundamental right, the Gallivan majority should have held that the
legislative restrictions placed on the initiative right prevented the
initiative power from being a fundamental right. Instead, the Gallivan
majority ignored the constitutional restrictions placed on the initiative
right and claimed that precedent indicated the use of the initiative power
was a fundamental right.89
In its opinion, the majority cited a variety of cases to support the
concept that the initiative power is a fundamental right.90 However, as
the dissent indicates, “a close reading of these cases shows that they do
not, in fact, support the majority’s conclusion that the ability to change
the law via the initiative is fundamental.”91
For example, in Gallivan the majority claims Shriver v. Bench
establishes the principle that “the reserved right and power of the
initiative is a fundamental right under . . . the Utah Constitution.”92
However, a closer analysis of Schriver belies the assertion that the
initiative power is a fundamental right. In fact, the holding in Schriver
actually limits the scope of the initiative power because the Schriver
court found that there was no right to use the initiative to address
administrative issues.93
The Gallivan majority’s assumption that Schriver provides a
fundamental initiative right is probably derived from Schriver’s assertion
that the “fundamental power” to deal with administrative issues like
salaries resides in the legislative power and in the people.94 On its face,
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
II.A.2.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Utah 2002).
Id. at 1081-82.
Id. at 1105 n.7.
Id. at 1080.
Schriver v. Bench, 313 P.2d 475 (Utah 1957). See discussion of Schriver supra Part
Schriver, 313 P.2d at 480.
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this statement from Schriver might seem to indicate that the initiative
right is fundamental. Nevertheless, close scrutiny of the statement itself
indicates the statement merely recognizes that both the legislative power
and the people have, under the proper circumstances, the ability to make
determinations concerning salaries.95 Indeed, in Schriver, the court
specifically noted that its decision not to use the initiative to address
salary issues did not remove or withhold from the people their
fundamental right to control salaries.96 Because the elected council in
charge of such salaries would be forced to set salaries in accordance with
the will of the people or be held accountable during the next election, the
court held that the initiative power was not needed to safeguard the
people’s fundamental power to control government salaries.97 Therefore,
Schriver should not be viewed as a case that establishes a fundamental
right to the initiative. To the contrary, the Schriver court repeatedly
recognizes limitations that diminish the initiative power rather than
secure the initiative right a place among the “narrow catalog of
fundamental rights.”98
3. The relationship between the initiative right and the fundamental
right to vote
The Gallivan majority also erred by using the obsolete legal
precedent established in Moore v. Ogilvie,99 rather than the more recent
holding in Burdick v. Takushi,100 to erroneously hold that the people’s
right to exercise the initiative power was fundamental. The holdings in
the United States Supreme Court cases Moore v. Ogilvie and Burdick v.
Takushi diverge sharply on the issue of whether all election procedures
must be subjected to strict scrutiny. By ignoring Burdick and relying
principally on the obsolete standard set in Moore, the Gallivan majority
departed from current election law and followed a case which was
described by the Gallivan dissent as “an evolutionary dead end.”101
In Moore, the United States Supreme Court held that a statute
requiring nominating petitions for candidates to include 200 signatures
from fifty of 102 counties was invalid because “[t]he use of nominating
petitions by independents to obtain a place on the [. . .] ballot is an

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Utah Pub. Employees Ass’n v. Utah, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980).
394 U.S. 814 (1969).
504 U.S. 428 (1992).
Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1107 n.8.
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integral part of [the] elective system.”102 The Moore Court further
explained that, all procedures used by a State as an integral part of the
election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination
or of abridgment of the right to vote.103
Since the Moore decision in 1969, the United States Supreme Court
has determined that not all procedures used to regulate the voting process
necessarily implicate the fundamental right to vote to a degree that would
require the application of strict scrutiny principles. This shift in
perspective is clearly illustrated in the Court’s 1992 holding in Burdick v.
Takushi. In Burdick, the Court acknowledged that “[c]ommon sense, as
well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must
play an active role in structuring elections.”104 In recognizance of this
principle, the Burdick Court indicated:
[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that
the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to
assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.
Accordingly, the mere fact that a State’s system “creates barriers . . .
tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might
choose . . . does not itself compel close scrutiny.”105

Burdick’s analysis indicates that the right to petition in order to place an
initiative on the ballot should not be considered a fundamental right
because the initiative petition right can be subject to reasonable voting
regulations without significantly implicating the fundamental voting
right and triggering strict scrutiny. In other words, as stated by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, “[In voting rights cases] the
thicket of strict scrutiny cases . . . separates into distinguishable groups,
and it appears that [a right to petition to put an initiative on the ballot]
does not fall within any one of them.”106
Although both Moore and Burdick are occasionally cited as
providing the standard of scrutiny applied to election regulations, most
courts believe Burdick supplies the correct standard of review.107 In fact,
the Gallivan dissent noted that since deciding Moore in 1969, the United

102. Moore, 394 U.S. at 818.
103. Id.
104. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Mass. Pub. Int. Research Group v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 375 N.E.2d 1175, 1182
(Mass. 1978).
107. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1378 (2d Cir. 1996) “[E]ven though ‘[e]lection
laws will invariably impose some burden on individual voters,’ not all restrictions on access to the
ballot merit strict scrutiny.” Id. at 1377 n.16; Mass. Pub. Int. Research Group, 375 N.E.2d at 118182.
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States Supreme Court has only cited Moore once (in 1979) as controlling
authority in any election or voting case.108 The Gallivan dissent also
noted that “petitioners concede that the approach articulated in Burdick
may be the more applicable guide” in determining whether election
regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.109 Given that Burdick supplies
the more appropriate standard, the Gallivan majority erred by relying
primarily on Moore, rather than Burdick, to support its claim that any law
that affects the initiative process is a per se infringement on the right to
vote.
B. The Major Difference Between the Majority and Dissent in Gallivan
is Essentially a Disagreement About Whether the Initiative Power is a
Fundamental Right
The dissent and majority in Gallivan employ different equal
protection analyses and reach opposite conclusions as to whether the
multi-county signature requirement is constitutional. However, the
motivation for these divergent analyses can be traced directly to whether
the initiative right is a fundamental right that merits strict scrutiny
protection. The true crux of the equal protection issue, then, is whether or
not the initiative power is a fundamental right. Since that issue has
already been addressed, this note will leave further discussion of
Gallivan’s equal protection issues for another day.
C. In Determining that the Initiative Signature Requirements Were
Severable, the Gallivan Majority Ignored Several Factors Customarily
Used to Determine Legislative Intent With Regard to Severability
The second major point of contention between the majority and
dissent in Gallivan was whether the multi-county signature requirement
was severable from Utah’s initiative provision. When dealing with
questions of severability the question regarding “[w]hether the part of a
statute that is held unconstitutional is severable from the remainder of the
statute depends on legislative intent.”110 In determining that Utah’s multicounty signature requirement was severable from the statewide signature
requirement the Gallivan majority did not give significant weight to the
factors traditionally used in severability determinations. The majority
began its analysis correctly by alluding to the traditional severability test
established in Lopes:
108. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1107 (Utah 2002).
109. Id. at 1108 (citations omitted). See also Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief at 18 n.20,
Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545).
110. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994).
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In determining if an unconstitutional subsection is severable from its
umbrella statute, “we look to legislative intent.” When the legislative
intent is not expressly stated, “we turn to the statute itself, and examine
the remaining constitutional portion of the statue in relation to the
stricken portion.” Upon reviewing the statute as a whole and its operation
absent the offending subsection, “[i]f the remainder of the statute is
operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose the statute will
be allowed to stand.”111
Although the Gallivan majority cited this established test as the
framework for its rationale, the majority then diverged from established
precedent by not according significant weight to traditional severability
factors like legislative history and express declarations of legislative
intent.
1. Statutes are presumed to be severable
The majority opinion recognized that statutes are presumed to be
severable. Utah case law indicates “that statutes, where possible, are to
be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a
portion of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is
unconstitutional, such should be done.”112 The majority in Gallivan
recognized this principle and correctly began its severability analysis
with a presumption that the multi-county signature requirement was
severable from the remainder of the initiative statute.113
2. Severability clauses provide express statements of legislative intent
The majority opinion in Gallivan acknowledged that a severability
clause would provide an express statement of legislative intent. In
analyzing Gallivan’s severability issue, the majority noted that “[t]he
legislature did not include an express indication of its legislative intent
regarding the severability of potentially unconstitutional portions of the
statute.”114 Although the legislature did not include a severability clause
anywhere in the election code, much less in any of the individual
statutory provisions of the initiative enabling act and its amendments,115
the absence of a severability clause in the text of the initiative statute
itself does not necessarily mean that the legislature never expressly

111. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1098 (quoting State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (Utah 2002)).
112. Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm’n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982).
113. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1098.
114. Id.
115. See Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief at 25, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002)
(No. 02-0545).
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indicated its intentions regarding the severability of Utah’s multi-county
signature requirements.
3. The role of legislative history in determining legislative intent
The Gallivan majority overlooked express statements in Utah’s
legislative history that revealed the legislative purpose behind Utah’s
signature requirements. Looking to the legislative history of a statute in
an effort to discern legislative intent on severability issues is an
acceptable method of determining legislative intent. In 1968 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied extensively on legislative history
in determining that a multi-county signature requirement for initiatives
was a very significant part of the statue and therefore was not severable
from the rest of the initiative statute.116
Just as the Massachusetts statute’s legislative history provided
insight into the severability of Massachusetts’ multi-county signature
requirement, Utah’s legislative history also supplies evidence that the
Utah Legislature placed a great deal of significance on the multi-county
signature requirement. In 1994, the Utah Legislature voted to increase
the multi-county signature requirement from fifteen counties to twenty
counties.117 During the debates surrounding the amended signature
requirement Representative Garn, a sponsor of the bill, explained the
purpose that motivated his proposal to raise the multi-county signature
requirement:
The first [issue related to this bill] is that this bill will assure the
citizens initiatives that go to the ballot are truly statewide issues. . . . If
we’re going to have initiatives on the ballot let’s make sure that they
are statewide issues. And increasing the counties from 15 to 20 does
just that. . . . Instead of having 15 counties with 10% of signatures
we’re increasing that to 20, so by doing that we make sure the
initiatives that go on the ballot are truly statewide initiatives.118

The legislative history shows Representative Garn’s sentiments
regarding the multi-county initiative were shared by many individuals
present during the legislative debates. For instance, Representative Bush
argued for the stricter multi-county requirement when he explained,
“[b]y making this so that more counties are involved we are actually
improving the democratic process . . . and giving more people a voice in
116. Mass. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 375 N.E.2d 1175,
1179-80 (Mass. 1978).
117. See Intervenors’ Supplemental Response in Opposition to Petition for Extraordinary Writ
at 31, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545).
118. Id. at 32 (quoting Tr. of Floor Debate of the Utah House of Representatives, Feb. 17 &
18, 1998).
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their government so that they can be involved in the initiative
process.”119
These excerpts of legislative history indicate that Utah’s legislators
felt strongly enough about the importance of the multi-county signature
requirement’s role in the initiative process that they amended the statute
in order to increase the effect of the multi-county signature requirement.
Since the legislature amended the initiative statute specifically to
increase the effect of the multi-county signature requirement, it can
reasonably be assumed that the legislature valued the role of this
particular signature requirement and would not have created an initiative
scheme that did not ensure that initiatives were “truly statewide issues.”
The history of Utah’s initiative statutory framework also indicates
that the multi-county signature requirement is an integral part of Utah’s
initiative process.120 The multi-county signature requirement has been
part of the initiative statutory framework since the initiative legislation
was first enacted in 1917.121 Until the Utah Supreme Court struck down
the provision in Gallivan, the multi-county signature requirement had
never been removed from the statute. In fact, over eighty-three years the
only action the legislature has taken in regard to the signature
requirements of the initiative statute was the 1984 amendment designed
to raise the requirements associated with the multi-county signature
requirement.122
D. The Gallivan Majority Erred in Holding that the Utah Legislature
Intended the Initiative Statute to be Severable Because Any Other
Legislative Intention Would Be Unconstitutional Under the Utah
Constitution
The Utah Supreme Court departed from precedent when it held the
legislature must have intended that the initiative statute to be severable
since any contrary intention of the legislature would amount to an
admission “that it [had] chosen to shirk its constitutional duty to establish
a framework for the exercise of the people’s constitutionally guaranteed
initiative right.”123 Rather than examine traditional indicators of
legislative intent like legislative history and statutory construction, the
court reasoned that “the legislature would have enacted the initiative
enabling statute without the multi-county signature requirement because
119. Id.
120. Intervenors’ Supplemental Response at 32, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002)
(No. 02-0545).
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1099 (Utah 2002).
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it is compelled to do so by subsection 2 of article VI, section 1 [of the
Utah Constitution] in order to enable the citizens to exercise their
reserved initiative power.”124 In other words, the court is saying that the
legislature has no power to create a nonseverable initiative statute
because, in the event that the initiative statute was completely stricken
from the Utah Code, the legislature would be in breach of its
constitutional duty to provide the public with statutory access to their
initiative rights.
Events in Utah’s legal history appear to contradict the court’s
assertion that the Utah Legislature would breach its constitutional duties
if the initiative enabling statutes were found to be nonseverable and
Utah’s citizens were thus temporarily bereft of means to put an initiative
on the ballot. The constitutional provision authorizing the Utah
Legislature to create a statutory scheme that enabled the people’s right to
exercise the initiative power was created in 1900. Nevertheless, the Utah
Legislature did not actually create an initiative enabling statutory scheme
until 1917.125 If the Legislature’s seventeen year delay in creating the
initial initiative enabling statute was not considered to be an
impermissible breach of its constitutional duties, then the brief absence
of initiative enabling legislation that would occur while the legislature
crafted acceptable replacement initiative enabling legislation should not
constitute a violation of the Legislature’s constitutional duties.
The fact that the multi-county signature requirement and the statewide signature requirement created in Utah’s initial initiative enabling
legislation remained essentially unchanged until Gallivan provides
additional evidence that the legislature recognized the importance of both
provisions and would not, under any circumstances, have intended these
provisions to be severable.126 The Utah Legislature’s Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel explains:
Neither [initiative signature requirement] standing alone has ever been
considered to be sufficient because the omission of either [requirement]
would dramatically alter the dynamics of qualifying a ballot initiative,
that, if passed, would affect the entire state. . . . Each [initiative
signature requirement] ensures a level of support for placing the
initiative on the ballot, that without the other, would be inadequate for a
statewide initiative with potential impacts on the whole state.127

124. Id.
125. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
126. See Amicus Curiae Response of Utah Legislature to Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 3,
Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545).
127. Id. at 3-4.
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Because the Utah Legislature has insisted on retaining both initiative
signature requirements for the past eighty-five years, any suggestion that
the Legislature would now be satisfied with an initiative enabling statute
containing only one of the two signature requirements would defy reason
and common sense.128
Finally, the rationale underlying the Gallivan majority’s holding that
the multi-county signature requirement is severable raises significant
public policy concerns. The Utah Constitution gives the legislature the
authority to create and regulate the initiative power. Nevertheless, under
the Gallivan majority’s holding, the actual intention of the legislature
regarding the severability of the multi-county signature requirement
becomes irrelevant. In effect, the majority’s ruling in Gallivan has
stripped the legislature of its constitutionally granted power to create a
statutory initiative framework that incorporates the “numbers, . . . the
conditions, . . .the manner, and . . . the time” specified by the
legislature.129 Instead, the ultimate authority to create initiative law
seems to have been appropriated from Utah’s Legislature by the Utah
Judiciary.
V. CONCLUSION
Just as Robert Frost’s two paths diverged from the crossroads in the
woods, the majority and dissenting opinions in Gallivan v. Walker
diverge sharply from one another. The opinions differ significantly on
whether the initiative right is fundamental and whether Utah’s multicounty signature requirement is severable from the rest of the initiative
statute. Throughout the decision, the majority opinion consistently
departs from the traditional criteria generally used to determine questions
regarding issues such as fundamental rights and severability and instead
bases its holdings on obsolete or untried legal principles. The majority’s
unconventional legal approach yields the wrong results in this instance.
The initiative power should not fall within Utah’s relatively small catalog
of fundamental rights because it does not form an implicit part of a free
society, its operation is heavily restricted by legislative limitations, and it
is not inseparably connected to the fundamental right to vote. Similarly,
the majority should not have held that Utah’s signature requirement was
severable from the rest of the initiative statute because such a ruling runs
contrary to legislative intent and impermissibly infringes upon the Utah
Legislature’s constitutionally granted powers. Fortunately, unlike Robert

128. Id. at 4.
129. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(i) (2002); see also Intervenors’ Supplemental Response at
32, Gallivan v. Walker 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002) (No. 02-0545).
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Frost, who doubted he would ever return to the particular divergence of
ways in the woods mentioned in his poem,130 the Utah Supreme Court
will probably have future opportunities to return to this particular legal
crossroads and revisit the questions of whether the initiative power is a
fundamental right and whether the legislature has the power to create a
nonseverable initiative signature requirement. When that time comes, the
court should follow the lead of Gallivan’s dissenting opinion and use
conventional legal precedents to hold that the use of the initiative power
is not a fundamental right and that initiative laws are nonseverable.
Jaysen Oldroyd

130. FROST, supra note 1, at 45.

